Introduction
A classic argument for income redistribution justifies it in terms of the decreasing marginal utility of added income as wealth increases. As an individual's stock of wealth increases, each additional unit of income is likely to provide her with less utility. When Dives is already rich, giving him more money benefits him very little. If
Lazarus is poor, giving him the money instead will benefit him greatly. If a main object of social policy is to provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number, then any redistribution of income from the wealthy to the poor that does not affect overall production may be justified or even obligatory.
One famous weakness of this argument is its dependence on interpersonal comparisons of utility. To justify giving some of Dives' income to Lazarus, it must be shown that Lazarus receives more utility from the added income than Dives loses in having it taken away. But interpersonal comparisons of utility are famously problematic. How could we ever know for certain how one person's enjoyment or discomfort compares to another's? Perhaps Dives gains more added comfort from another silk cushion in his palace than Lazarus receives from his one meal a day.
Intuitively this might seem unlikely, but how, in the absence of any more scientific test, do we know that we should trust our intuitions?
In this paper I shall argue that John Kenneth Galbraith, in The Affluent Society, found a way around this objection. This allowed him to develop a version of the argument presented above in favour of a specific sort of income redistribution from the private sector to the public sector. More specifically, Galbraith argued for a redirection of income from profit-takers in the private sector to recipients of public services. Of course, insofar as these two populations might overlap, it may seem incorrect to describe this as an argument for redistribution. Perhaps it should rather be seen as an argument for converting income in one form -private profits from the sale of consumer goods -into income in another form -receipt of government services.
Nevertheless, I argue that Galbraith's logic works most powerfully to support a specifically redistributive argument. His reasoning is really a variant on the redistributive reasoning presented above, one that can survive scepticism about interpersonal comparisons of utility. It justifies his proposal to transfer resources from the private to the public sector only insofar as such a transfer would serve to redistribute income from the rich to the poor.
Galbraith and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
Before looking at The Affluent Society, it will be helpful to see what Galbraith thought about the Pigovian argument and its problematic dependence on interpersonal utility comparisons. In his History of Economics, he discussed how classical economists came to regard such comparisons as impossible to make: ...[I]t was not possible to say that the one with more goods had less satisfaction from an increment than the one who had fewer. The feelings of different people were not comparable; to make such comparisons was to deny the depth and complexity of human emotions, and this was a denial of the scientific modes of thought to which all good and reputable economists aspired. (Galbraith 1987, 212-13) 2011, 167) Galbraith, speaking for Pigou, provided no obvious antidote against such bloody-mindedness. Indeed, he acknowledged, without further comment, that "the comparison of interpersonal utilities remained suspect" after Pigou.
The trend in economic theory following Pigou was generally towards the rejection of interpersonal utility-comparisons. 1 Allan Gibbard summarises what he calls the "historical lore" concerning this period of economic thought:
In the first place, under the influence of logical positivism, English-speaking economists followed the lead of Pareto, and came to deny the meaningfulness of interpersonal comparisons of interpersonal utilities.... In the second place, economists noted that in the theory of supply and demand, quantitative utilities were superfluous. An economic agent, on the old theory, always chooses, from among the alternatives open to him, the one of greatest utility for him. Equivalently, though, it could be said that the agent chooses, from among the available alternatives, the one he most prefers. When the theory of rational choice is put that way, quantitative utility has been purged from it and replaced by preference orderings -which cannot be added together. (Gibbard 1986, 166) One crucial point here is that post-Marginalist utility theory did not merely give up on the idea of interpersonal utility comparisons. Rather, it gave up on the idea of measuring absolute utility altogether. Economists could speak, perhaps, of a certain satisfaction bringing more utility to a single agent than another satisfaction, in the sense of ranking higher in the agent's preference ordering. But they could not speak sensibly of any satisfaction having some absolute quantity of utility attached to it.
As Gibbard explains, the move from quantitative utility to preference ordering as a measure of welfare -the move from cardinal to ordinal utility theory -was motivated by normative as well as methodological concerns. Robbins' argument makes no reference to this thesis. He does, however, betray a commitment to some sort of positivism, meaning the determination to justify all substantive claims by empirical evidence.
3 The claim that this amounts to a general empirical test of preference is in fact deeply problematic. See also Rosenberg 1981, 58-67. One example of a normative reason for the shift is that ordinal utility theory appears to embody a kind of anti-paternalism that many liberal economists found, and continue to find, attractive. It makes choice-behaviour the sole indicator of welfare.
As a result nothing but the outcome of free exchanges can be known to be Pareto optimal. If a social order results from such free exchanges, the interventions of a would-be reformer cannot be justified in terms of Pareto-efficiency. Gibbard argues that this anti-paternalist reasoning is, in fact, confused. (Gibbard 1986, 168-72) .
Nevertheless, the fact that ordinal theory makes it seem available may have been enough to motivate defenders of the free market to embrace it.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to trace the precise ways and degrees in which such normative and methodological concerns provoked the move from cardinal to ordinal welfare theory. What is clear is that the shift installed a screen of scepticism before the Pigovian justification of redistribution. The latter depends very much on the idea of absolute quantities of utility that can be compared among agents.
How far, then, did Galbraith feel constrained to respect this development in economic theory and the commitments that supported it? That he did aim, in The Affluent Society, to respect such commitments is suggested by his declared resolution to tackle orthodox economic theory "on its own terrain" (Galbraith 1999, 124 Yesterday the man with a minimal but increasing real income was reaping the satisfactions which came from a decent diet and a roof that no longer leaked water on his face. Today, after a large increase in his income, he has extended his consumption to include cable television and eccentric loafers. But to say that his satisfactions from these latter amenities and recreations are less than from the additional calories and the freedom from rain is wholly improper. Things have changed; he is a different man; there is no real standard for comparison. (Galbraith 1999, 121) The later man prefers the superior loafers (presumably to the leisure he gave up in working to pay for them) as the earlier man prefers the superior shelter. But if we can speak only of preference orderings then we cannot compare the absolute levels of satisfaction achieved in each case. Thus there are no grounds for the assumption that the marginal utility of added income (and thus, assuming the income is spent, added consumption) diminishes with accumulation. The later man might, for all we know, get as much pleasure from the loafers as the earlier man got from his shelter.
Galbraith therefore conceded that:
The scholar who wishes to believe that with increasing affluence there is no reduction in the urgency of desires and goods is not without points for debate. However plausible the case against him, it cannot be proven. (Galbraith 1999, 124) He then claimed, nevertheless, to have a reply to this imagined scholar, which I shall examine below. The key question for this article is whether his reply is sufficient to revivify the Pigovian argument. I shall argue that it is.
The Dependence Effect and the Programme of The Affluent Society
Before turning to Galbraith's specific response to the above claims concerning comparisons of utility, it is necessary to briefly explain their context in the general vision of The Affluent Society. While the book ranges widely over economic questions concerning economic security, control over prices, market control, poverty, debt, inflation, and many other issues, it is remarkably focused on a single problem.
Galbraith calls this "the problem of social balance". The problem is that the current economic system abundantly, even excessively, satisfies our general demand for private consumption goods while failing to adequately satisfy our general demand for public goods and services (Galbraith was writing in the United States of 1958, though he republished the book with small amendments in 1998). The resulting situation is one of "private opulence and public squalor", as Galbraith put it in one of his memorable phrases (Galbraith 1999, 191) . Ironically, our poverty in public goods and services often precludes the enjoyment of the private goods so abundantly provided, as Galbraith expressed in what is possibly his most famous passage:
The family which takes its mauve and cerise, air-conditioned, power-steered and power-braked automobile out for a tour passes through cities that are badly paved, made hideous by litter, blighted buildings, billboards and posts for wires that should long since have been put underground. They pass into a countryside that has been rendered largely invisible by commercial art. … They picnic on exquisitely packaged food from a portable icebox by a polluted stream and go on to spend the night at a park which is a menace to public health and morals. Just before dozing off on an air mattress, beneath a nylon tent, amid the stench of decaying refuse, they may reflect vaguely on the curious unevenness of their blessings. Is this, indeed, the American genius? (Galbraith 1999, 187-8) Galbraith's central claim was thus that more should be spent on providing public goods and services so as to maximize social welfare. Under the current imbalanced system, "far from systematically exploiting the opportunities to derive use and pleasure from [public] services, we do not supply what would keep us out of trouble." (Galbraith 1999, 193) Galbraith's great weakness, which opponents like Milton Friedman regularly exploited, was that he appeared to base his normative argument upon his own personal preferences. 6 He might want more public services, opponents could say, but the right social choice is not simply the one preferred by some famous economist. We have evidence that the general public, on the whole, prefers things just as they are.
They have, after all, chosen to spend their money on cars and fancy tents rather than on hiring workers to repair the roads and clean up litter. Perhaps the market is unable to provide the latter services since, as Galbraith puts it, they do not "lend themselves to being sold to individuals" (Galbraith 1999, 234) . But then the public could, if it chose, use its voting power to pressure governments to provide them. Since they have not done so, this is some evidence that the situation, however distasteful to Galbraith, is the outcome of public choice.
Galbraith was aware of this possible line of reply:
The conventional wisdom holds that the community, large or small, makes a decision as to how much it will devote to its public services. This decision is arrived at by democratic process. Subject to the imperfections and uncertainties of democracy, people decide how much of their private income and goods they will surrender in order to have public services of which they are in greater need. Thus there is a balance, however rough, in the enjoyments to be had from private goods and services and those rendered by public authority. (Galbraith 1999, 193) His response made reference to an idea theorised earlier in the work -the "dependence effect":
It will be obvious, however, that this view depends on the notion of independently determined consumer wants. In such a world, one could with some reason defend the doctrine that the consumer, as a voter, makes an independent choice between public and private goods. But given the dependence effect -given that consumer wants are created by the process by which they are satisfied -the consumer makes no such choice. (Galbraith 1999, 194) This shows the centrality of the dependence effect -yet to be explained -to (Friedman 1978, 32) . On the assumption that the current economic situation expresses, via markets and democracy, the wishes of the public, the idea that
Galbraith's personal disapproval should justify modifying it would indeed express the motives imputed by Friedman. But Galbraith made no such assumption, and it was his theory of the dependence effect that kept him from having to do so.
Galbraith introduced his theory of the dependence effect right after the passage, already quoted, in which he conceded the strength of the argument against the possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons:
The scholar who wishes to believe that with increasing affluence there is no reduction in the urgency of desires and goods is not without points for debate. However plausible the case against him, it cannot be proven. (Galbraith 1999, 124) We may now examine his reply:
However, there is a flaw in the case. If the individual's wants are to be urgent, they must be original with himself. They cannot be urgent if they must be contrived for him. And above all, they must not be contrived by the process of production by which they are satisfied. (Galbraith 1999, 124) The idea seems to be that if the acquisition of certain goods only creates new unsatisfied desires for more goods, then the acquisition may result in no net increase in satisfaction at all. Depending on the strength of the resulting new desires, the effect may even be one of net dissatisfaction. This is somewhat implicit in a quotation
Galbraith draws from James Dusenberry: "the desire to get superior goods … provides a drive to higher expenditure which may even be stronger than that arising out of the needs which are supposed to be satisfied by that expenditure." (Duesenberry 1949 , 38, Galbraith 1999 Thus the dependence effect theory was explicitly held by Galbraith both to indicate a "flaw" in the anti-Pigovian argument, based on the impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons, and to serve as a reply to the objection that the current balance between private and public goods is simply the outcome of individual choices. How did it achieve this? And how were these two functions of the theory linked?
The Logic of the Dependence Effect
While Dusenberry's claim, quoted above, may make sense intuitively, it is not clear how it can survive the commitment to ordinal utility theory. It is, recall, a constraint of that theory that, while satisfactions can be preferentially ranked by a single agent, no intrinsic utility-value can be assigned to any satisfaction. As Galbraith himself admitted, this means not only that the level of utility of two agents cannot be compared; it also means that the level of utility of an agent at one point in time cannot be compared with her utility at a later point if time. This is because in the intervening interval her preferences may change. Her new preference ordering will be simply incommensurate with the old; satisfactions may be compared within each ranking, but not between one ranking and another. But if the process of satisfying a want creates new wants -new preferences -then the agent emerges from the process with a new preference-ordering. It is then impossible to determine whether she is more or less satisfied in absolute terms than he was before, and Dusenberry's claim is at best unprovable and at worst meaningless.
Yet Galbraith hoped to use the dependence effect theory to prove that certain wants are not "urgent". What he presumably meant by this was that the satisfaction of such wants does not bring any significant increase in welfare or perhaps even reduces it. This is why it is justified to take income that agents would, even by their free choice, have used to satisfy such wants and to spend it instead on providing public services. This will make them better off than they would have been if they had been able to realise their own choices, for their choices were not really conducive to their increased utility. As Steven Pressman summarizes Galbraith's argument:
We do not need to worry very much about the substitution effects of government programs to aid the poor and near-poor because … the goods we lose are not that important if our wants for them have to be manufactured.
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But does this not involve comparing the welfare lost (or perhaps gained) by some agents in giving up access to certain goods against the welfare gained by other agents via the provision of public aid? The answer must be no. Galbraith would not have offered the dependence effect theory as a direct response to an anti-Pigovian argument based on the incomparability of interpersonal utility if that theory were itself vulnerable to the exact same argument. To understand how it avoids such vulnerability, we ought to look at it more closely.
In the course of explaining how wants can be "contrived by the process that satisfies them" -the dependence effect -Galbraith provided two examples of "contrived" desires. First, there are wants arising from envy. As he succinctly put it, there are cases where "[o]ne man's consumption becomes his neighbor's wish" (Galbraith 1999, 124) . The desire is contrived insofar as one acquires it only because she has observed another satisfying a similar desire. Then there are wants created by advertising: the "central function" of "the institutions of modern advertising and salesmanship [is to] create desires -to bring into being wants that previously did not exist" (Galbraith 1999, 124) . 8 On Galbraith's view these are both instances of wants being contrived by the process of satisfying them, since this process -the sale and purchase of consumer goods -inevitably breeds envy and empowers producers to do more advertising.
It remains to be determined what precisely a contrived desire is for Galbraith.
One clue comes from his assertion that contrived desires are distinct from needs that are fixed by physiology:
A man who is hungry need never be told of his need for food. If he is inspired by his appetite, he is immune to the influence of Messrs Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborn. 9 The latter are effective only with those who are so far removed from physical want that they do not already know what they want. In this state alone men are open to persuasion. (Galbraith 1999, 129, my emphasis) This suggests that advertising misinforms consumers about their own preferences rather than actually altering their preference rankings. On this way of interpreting Galbraith, there is no actual modification of preferences resulting from the "contrivance" of want. Preferences are stable, represented by the unchanging indifference curves. The agent subject to the contrivance is simply misinformed about her preferences. This allows Galbraith's theory to be reconciled with ordinal utility theory. The claim that the satisfaction of a contrived desire does not bring any real increase in welfare translates to the claim that such a satisfaction does not move one to a new utility curve. It does not mean that one's utility curves have shifted -that is, that one's preference-orderings have changed. Thus to determine the effects of contrived desire upon utility requires no comparisons between distinct preference orderings. It is perfectly representable within ordinal utility theory.
There is further evidence that this is the right model for what Galbraith meant.
In a later work he proposed that "the emancipation of belief" might be sufficient to make consumers less subject to advertising (Galbraith 1975, 248) . This is some textual evidence to suggest that Galbraith took advertising to work on belief rather than on preference. The assumption of relatively stable preferences is fundamental to standard consumer demand theory, whereas models involving imperfect informationbad beliefs -are fairly standard. This again shows that the argument can be maintained within the framework of standard consumer demand theory. Again Galbraith's commitment to tackle that theory "on its own terrain" is sustained.
This reading, however, has the misfortune of being in disagreement with Galbraith's own son, who writes:
In The Affluent Society, we find a logical demolition of the orthodox theory of consumer choice. It proceeds from the unassailable observation that stable preferences cannot exist for goods that do not exist. … This is, in essence, a plain-English version of the point about instability of preference fields that Philip Mirowski (1989) drove home in More Heat than Light three decades later.
It seems imprudent, despite the textual evidence, to challenge a reading of Galbraith's argument made by his own son; clearly the latter had access to more than the textual evidence. The most I can say in reply is that my reading makes greater sense out of the dialectic of Galbraith's general argument in The Affluent Society. The objection Galbraith anticipated to his own view, which was soon actually articulated by Friedman and others, amounted to the question: "Who are you to advocate changes to a social arrangement arising out of voluntary exchanges?" His reply was, in effect:
"Those exchanges were only made due to wants for private goods that were contrived through the dependence effect". If "wants contrived through the dependence effect" is taken to mean "wants corresponding to changes in agent's preferences, resulting from the process that satisfies their wants", then it is unclear why Galbraith's reply should have any force at all. If people come out of the process of satisfying their consumer desires with new preference fields defined over new consumer goods then who is to say whether or not they are better off, in absolute terms, in their new state than they were in the old? No doubt they are still dissatisfied, but perhaps it is a happier, less nagging dissatisfaction than the older one. Any judgment for or against this possibility would involve a reversion to the rejected notion that satisfactions can be compared across distinct preference fields.
By contrast, if "wants contrived through the dependence effect" means "wants resulting from misinformation about agents' own preferences", that is, wants that do not track agents' true preferences, then the argument is valid, even within standard theory. To take from the public funds that it was using to satisfy wants that did not represent its true preferences, and then to spend them in ways that do satisfy its true preferences, is clearly to make the public better off, at least in material terms. The fact that the public did not choose to do this on its own only shows that it was deceived by contrived, meaning false, wants: wants that did not track its real preferences at all. This reading therefore draws far more force out of Galbraith's argument. It also allows it to work within standard consumer choice theory, legitimating his claim to be tackling that theory "on its own terrain". And to Galbraith fils' objection that stable preferences cannot exist for goods that do not exist, a reply may be found below.
Therefore, with all due caution and respect, I propose that a charitable view of Galbraith père's consistency of vision bids us believe that he intended or at the very least ought to have intended "contrived wants" to mean "wants based on false beliefs about one's own preferences", and not to mean "wants resulting from some external modification of one's preferences".
The neo-Pigovian Argument
Reading Galbraith's theory in this way shows how it allows for the revival of the Pigovian argument. Galbraith, as we have seen, explicitly presented his dependence effect theory against the argument that "with increasing affluence there is [or might be] no reduction in the urgency of desires and goods" (my emphasis). We have already seen the reason: people are more susceptible to the dependence effect the more they have satisfied their basic needs. Again, if a man "is inspired by his appetite, he is immune to the influence of Messrs Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborn".
Galbraith does not explain why this is so, but, reading his argument in the way I propose, one can readily construct an explanation on his behalf. One could, for example, speculate as follows. The cost of mistakes concerning the preferences that correspond to one's basic physiological needs is very high -indeed often fatal. The cost of mistakes about one's preferences for luxury goods -those that one will satisfy only once one's basic needs are met -is much lower. Thus it is likely that humans will develop powerful cognitive equipment for gaining accurate information about the former kind of preference, whereas the development of equipment for gaining accurate information about the latter kind of preference is not worth the trouble. As a result, people will, as a whole, be easier to misinform about their preferences for luxury goods than they will about their preferences for food, shelter, etc. The more affluent people become -the smaller the proportion of their income they spend on catering to their basic needs -the more they will fall victim to misinformation concerning their preferences. This is a mere suggestion; I am sure that other stories could be told to justify the assumption that it is easier to mislead people about their preferences for luxuries than about their preferences for basic goods.
At any rate, making the assumption allows one to reformulate the Pigovian argument. A person who is poor enough to remain less than fully satisfied in terms of basic needs will, up to a point, spend additional income still catering for such needs.
By contrast, a rich person will spend little or no part of the same amount of additional income satisfying his basic needs. Much of the rest will be spent satisfying preferences of the sort that give rise to contrived wants. The portion spent on satisfying such wants is merely wasted in terms of welfare, defined as the satisfaction of real preferences. If it were instead transferred to the poor person, there would be a net increase in overall welfare.
This argument requires no interpersonal comparisons of utility. It requires only a distinction between genuine wants that represent real preferences and contrived wants that do not. To apply it generally requires an assumption that the portion of one's wants consisting of contrived wants increases fairly steadily with increasing affluence. The argument for Pigovian redistribution is then merely one for the avoidance of unnecessary waste.
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Not only does Galbraith's dependence effect theory allow for this revival of the Pigovian argument; to a great extent his own use of it really amounts to such a revival. It is true that the problem he proposes to solve is not one of inequality per se: the family portrayed in his famous vignette is not living in poverty, yet it is said to suffer the effects of public squalor. Thus it appears that his case is not so much for redistributing income from the more to the less affluent as it is for using more of everyone's resources to provision everyone -rich and poor alike -with more public goods and services. Indeed Galbraith proposes to finance more public spending using sales taxes, a rather regressive mode of taxation, and blames an undue emphasis on income inequality for preventing other "liberals" from endorsing this programme (Galbraith 1999, ch.21, §v) .
12 Despite all this, it is only as a kind of Pigovian argument that Galbraith's case appears at all compelling.
To see this, consider Galbraith's justification for this policy:
The community is affluent in privately produced goods. It is poor in public services. The obvious solution is to tax the former to provide the latter -by making private goods more expensive, public goods are made more abundant. Motion pictures, electronic entertainment and cigarettes are made more costly so that schools can be more handsomely supported. We pay more for soap, 11 Of course any transfer of wealth from the richer to the poorer person will in real cases most likely inhibit the richer person's ability to satisfy some of her real wants as well as her contrived wants. It is barely possible to suppose that real wants are so much more urgent in the richer person than in the poorer person as to override any net-welfare benefits arising from the elimination of waste in the transfer of income. Scepticism about cardinal utility is one thing, but this is turbocharged quibbling.
12 In using the term "liberal" here I conform to the American usage. The term actually means something like "social democrat", but for historical reasons political labels involving the word "social" are best avoided in the United States. See Judt 2010, 4-6. detergents and vacuum cleaners in order that we may have a cleaner urban environment and less occasion to use them. We have more expensive cars and gasoline so that we have more agreeable streets on which to drive them. Food being relatively cheap, we tax it in order to have better medical services and better health in which to enjoy it. (Galbraith 1999, 229) This will restrict the consumption of privately produced consumer goods, of course.
But, Galbraith supposes, this consumption was bringing little increase in welfare, while increased provision of public works and infrastructure would bring a great deal.
How is Galbraith certain in this supposition? One argument for it could be that public goods and services enhance both the production and the enjoyment of private goods: more roads allows for more cars to be driven, and better public education produces more engineers to design them. But this is a fairly weak argument. If the government is justified in restricting the sale of consumer goods, because the desire for those goods is largely contrived rather than real, then it seems contradictory to promote its provision of public goods on the grounds that this enhances the usage and production of those same consumer goods.
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A far better argument refers back to the theory that consumer desires are increasingly contrived as the consumer's affluence increases. Public services, especially in the United States, are primarily used by and primarily benefit the less affluent -those who cannot afford private education and healthcare, those who require unemployment services, those -a central topic for Galbraith -whose participation in the economy is dependent on anti-poverty programs. 14 Their wants are on the whole less contrived than those of affluent consumers, and so spending on them is far more efficient in adding to net welfare than spending on consumer goods 13 To this extent I believe that Lamdin's assessment of Galbraith's advocacy of public spending in terms of its effect on productivity somewhat misses the point. See Lamdin 2011, 608-9. marketed to the affluent. But this means that Galbraith's scheme -increased sales taxes to finance further spending on public services -is at its heart a redistribution scheme.
It is not, of course, merely redistributive, since it does not simply transfer wealth or income from the rich to the poor. Rather, it ensures that income flows to the poor in a specific form -that of public services. But this is in part a matter of it so happening that many of the things the less affluent need are the kinds of things that (at least in Galbraith's view) only the government sector can reliably provide: education, mass transport, crime prevention, unemployment and health insurance, poverty programmes, etc. If this were not the case, if such things could be reliably provided by the free market so long as those in need of them had the cash to buy them, then
Galbraith's scheme would perhaps be modified into one for redistributing income in the form of cash. Indeed, such a scheme, in the form of a negative income tax, was proposed by Friedman; the primary disagreement between the two friends was over the relative efficiencies of government agencies and private firms in providing essential services. 15 At any rate, it is only as a redistributive scheme that Galbraith's proposal finds any justification on the basis of the dependence effect. It is because its costs accrue to the more affluent and its benefits go to the less affluent that it is likely to divert income that would have been spent satisfying contrived wants into income that satisfies real wants.
Economically, of course, one might object that raising sales taxes on luxury goods might simply reduce spending on those goods and thus reduce output altogether. This could have the effect of simply making everybody poorer. On the other hand, some suggest that the consumption of goods supported by advertising in fact works to prevent output from reaching its full potential. 16 But net output as such is largely irrelevant to Galbraith's argument. What matters is not the number of wants satisfied but their overall urgency. In this sense we might say that the argument is classically Pigovian.
I shall now show how this reading of the dependence effect theory can help to defend it against some criticisms. 17 Criticisms of the theory, at least for a time, tended to come not from mainstream economists but rather from economists of the 'Austrian' school. 18 I shall also show that Galbraith's theory can be modelled using the tools of standard microeconomic theory, using strategies that economists like Gary Becker have pursued. I shall end by showing that the application of Galbraith's Pigovian argument to any specific social situation would require developments to 16 Dutt, who provides a model in which this is the result, explains the basic logic as follows:
"If advertising expenditures increase workers consumption, they may experience a rise in income in the short run because of the expansionary effect of higher spending by both workers and capitalists. But with increases in capitalist income and the desire by workers to emulate them, workers become borrowers and eventually net debtors. As their debt increases, workers experience a decline in their net income, and with a redistribution of income (from interest payments), there is a contractionary effect on demand, because capitalist interest earners have a higher saving propensity than workers." (Dutt 2008, 547) This explanation involves the other side of the dependence effect -envy -and the role of debt -two topics I have not been able to address in this article. microeconomic theory that Galbraith neither provided nor indicated how to provide.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Galbraith, in reviving the Pigovian argument, provided a means of justifying redistribution that remained within the terms of standard microeconomic theory rather than, as many other such arguments do, requiring normative commitments or macroeconomic considerations that go beyond those terms.
The Austrian Criticisms
One criticism came from Friedrich Hayek. In a lecture entitled "The Non-Sequitur of the Dependence Effect", Hayek tried to reduce to absurdity Galbraith's claim that contrived wants are not urgent:
Most needs which make us act are needs for things which only civilization teaches us exist at all, and these needs are wanted by us because they produce feelings or emotions which we would not know if it were not for our cultural inheritance. (Hayek 1961) This, Hayek pointed out, includes our desires not only for the objects of advertising, but also for literature and art: "Surely an individual's want for literature is not original with himself in the sense that he would experience it if literature were not produced." Thus Galbraith's central claim that "[i]f the individual's wants are to be urgent, they must be original with himself" (Galbraith 1999, 124) entails that the desire for literature should be paid little regard in social planning, as should most needs that make us act.
The distinction Hayek made here reflects one later made by Amartya Sen, between basic preferences, which are independent of beliefs, and non-basic preferences, which arise out of basic preferences combined with beliefs (Sen 1970, ch.5 social influences help agents to know their own preferences or only to be mistaken about them. Galbraith's view was that advertising and envy achieve the latter, and that they work particularly well on the more affluent and on preferences for consumer goods. Perhaps Hayek had doubts about these latter views. Yet he provided little in the way of arguments against them, though we shall soon explore one such argument provided by Rothbard.
One way to remove the force from Hayek's objections would be to represent the dependence effect using Gary Becker's model, which treats households like firms in standard production models. Household consumption is seen as a kind of production process; just as a factory owner purchases raw steel to produce automobile parts, households purchase market goods as "raw materials" and then use them to produce "commodities". The latter term, somewhat idiosyncratically, does not refer to concrete goods available on the market; rather it seems to refer to the intangible benefits such purchases ultimately aim to bring to the consumer -pleasure, health, status, etc. The household's ultimate preferences are for these; it purchases consumer (market) goods as means to produce them (Becker 1978, Stigler and Becker 1977) .
For example, my household buys literature and uses it to produce the "commodity"
21 See Mill 1991, II. Mill was working within a cardinal utility theory and trying to include within it the idea of levels as well as quantities of utility. There is no obvious way in which this idea is directly relevant to Galbraith, who, I have argued, largely respects the methodological commitments that lead to the rejection of cardinal utility theory.
edification, which is what I ultimately want the literature for. Households maximize utility according to the function:
where U is utility and Zi is the quantity of the commodity i. The quantity Zi is determined by the function:
where xi is the quantity of market goods bought, ti is the time available for production, and E defines the relevant production techniques and capital requirements. One component of E will be information about how to convert xi into Zi. If the information a household possesses is particularly poor (as if it is misled by advertising or blinded by envy), then it will have to buy a great deal more of xi to produce an equal amount of Zi -more than it would have if it had had access to better information. With sufficiently bad information, it might invest in market goods that are simply the wrong raw materials: no amount of them could be actually sufficient for the production of the commodity.
One may believe that to regard households as firms, or the derivation of satisfaction from market goods as the production of household goods, is to propound a helpful metaphor rather than to perform a scientific analysis. 22 But at any rate Becker's technique allows for the modelling of situations in which people's satisfaction of contrived desires fails to satisfy any real preferences. One's preference is for the commodity; market goods are wanted only for its production. Indeed,
Becker and Stigler applied this model to explain the various positive and negative 22 The dangers of taking it as anything more than this are given a compelling airing in Emmett 2006.
This article is Emmett's attempt to deduce what Frank Knight might have written had he lived long enough to respond to Becker and Stigler. effects that advertising can have on a household's utility-maximizing activity ( (Stigler and Becker 1977, 83-7) ). They offered this partly as a refutation of what they took Galbraith to have claimed, which was that advertising works by changing people's preferences for commodities (Stigler and Becker 1977, 83-4) . There is no reason to read him this way. When he spoke of advertisers contriving wants, he need not have meant by "wants" the basic desires that households possess for commodities. He may have meant only the non-basic desires that households form for market goods.
Households form such desires on the basis of their belief, fostered in part by
advertising, that such market goods can be used to produce the commodities for which stable desires already exist. 23 If advertising fosters false beliefs, households can end up with non-basic desires for things that do not actually help them to satisfy their basic desires; they end up with wants whose satisfaction will not play any role in satisfying their true preferences.
Hayek was therefore wrong to imagine that Galbraith needed to regard all or even most non-basic wants as unreal. The only wants Galbraith had to regard as unreal were those depending on very poor information -wants whose satisfaction would have very little to do with the subject's true preferences. "The beauty of the economic man", wrote Alfred North Whitehead (Galbraith quoted him), "was that we knew exactly what he was after" (Galbraith 1974 , 121, Whitehead 1947 were", wrote Whitehead, "he knew them and his neighbours knew them" (Whitehead 1947 , 119, my emphasis). There seems little in common experience to motivate this assumption; without it we are free to imagine that in many cases "economic man" mistakenly pursues things that he is not really after at all -or, as Becker might have it, pursues things that play no role in helping him to produce what he is really after.
This leads to another criticism, found in Hayek's lecture but elaborated in more detail by Murray Rothbard. It is also found outside the Austrian school (Friedman 1978, 15) . It repudiates the claim that advertising, on the whole, peddles misinformation. This, Rothbard believed, would be a costly undertaking for the advertising firms, requiring expensive programmes of propaganda and brainwashing.
"Why", asked Rothbard, "should businessmen go to the expense, bother, and uncertainty of trying to create new wants, when they could far more easily look for better or cheaper ways of fulfilling wants that consumers already have?" (Rothbard 2004, 979) .
Again, however, Rothbard failed to appreciate that what Galbraith supposed was not that advertisers forcibly manipulate the preferences of consumers. Rather, they give them bad information about how best to satisfy their preferences. In some cases this might save the advertising firms trouble and expense. One could readily turn Rothard's question around and ask: "Why should businessmen go to the trouble of finding out what really satisfies customers' preferences, when they could just convince customers that their preferences will be satisfied by whatever the firms are already producing?" Rothbard's supposition that modifying people's preferences would be an expensive undertaking is plausible enough -manipulation at that level probably requires a good deal of psychological expertise and effort. But there is no good reason to suppose that bad information should be more costly to produce than good information. If anything the opposite seems likely. Bearing in mind Becker's analogy between household consumption and capitalist production, consider a case where you wish to purchase from me whatever is needed to make soap. I could go to the trouble of finding out how to make soap and sourcing the required ingredients for you. Or I could just sell you whatever I happen to have lying around, so long as I can convince you of its necessity for soap-manufacture. If I am a sufficiently adept dissembler, the latter will be the cheapest, easiest option for me. Likewise, a productive firm whose fixed capital is already set up for the production of X might find it cheaper to convince consumers that X will help them to satisfy their preferences than to find out what will truly satisfy their preferences and begin producing that.
Rothbard could reply to this that in an efficient market the supply of both information and misinformation should match demand, rendering the equilibrium price of the former high and that of the latter low. In this case we should expect the supply of information to exceed that of misinformation, and thus for advertising to work primarily by providing the former. But it is well known that a competitive market for information need not be efficient. Kenneth Arrow has provided several arguments to this effect (Arrow 1984, 142-3) . One of the most compelling is that information about preferences gives way to a common knowledge problem; it is in my are an index of womanly virtue", and that "modest intoxication" is "a mark of suave respectability" (Galbraith 1975, 156) . Presumably we are not mistaken about our preference for happiness, and some people really are seeking womanly virtue and suave respectability. The advertiser's role is to find out that we want such things and then convince us of the capacity of consumer goods to produce them. To return to our example from above, if I am to convince you to buy something for use in producing soap, I must first find out that you are hoping to produce soap and then learn what you already believe in order to know what I can and cannot convince you is a crucial ingredient in soap. Likewise, market research, Galbraith claimed, is often conducted "to ascertain the effectiveness of different kinds of persuasion or how well different products, brands or packages lend themselves to such persuasion" (Galbraith 1975, 153 ). This could mean finding out our preferences and existing beliefs in order to appropriately target misinformation about how best to satisfy our preferences and thus to contrive wants.
Galbraith's claims about contrived wants are therefore not refuted by the arguments discussed above. As those claims remain plausible, so does the conclusion of Galbraith's neo-Pigovian argument.
Assessment of Galbraith's Argument
To show, however, that Galbraith's theory is right, rather than just not obviously wrong, would require a great deal more than he provides. For one thing, it would require a means of identifying contrived desires with more rigour than the mere consultation of common sense allows. If wants can be contrived, choice behaviour will not always reliably indicate true preference. One must then determine what observable properties can be used as reliable indicators: testimony, neurological phenomena, tell-tale signs like Freudian slips, or whatever else psychologists and social scientists come up with. Alternatively, one might (as Becker does) retain the assumption that choices indicate preference but hold that this is subject to the constraints of available information. Then the task will be to quantify information. This is hardly a trifle. As Becker and Stigler note:
The quantity of information is a complex notion: its degree of accuracy, its multidimensional properties, its variable obsolescence with time are all qualities that make direct measurement of information extremely difficult. (Stigler and Becker 1977, 84) Clearly a variety of strategies for identifying real preferences, rather than identifying preference with the outcome of choice, are actively pursued today in economics, cognitive science, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and beyond.
Robbins was correct to point out that measuring blood pressure is unlikely to help; he was perhaps too hasty in ruling out all other possibilities. But it is well beyond me to comment on whether recent results seem in any way to justify the application of Galbraith's Pigovian argument.
An empirical evaluation of Galbraith's claim that advertising creates demand for consumer goods can be found in (Lamdin 2011 show that consumers do not nevertheless makes themselves better off through such Veblenic consumption. Determining the latter will require empirically reliable ways of deciding not only whether wants are thus determined by envy, but also whether or not the resulting wants nevertheless embody truly represented preferences. 26 Lamdin surveys a variety of studies attempting to identify the direction of causation between advertising and consumption. Hsu, Darrat, Zhong and Abosedra 2002 , Schmalensee 1972 , Simon 1970 find that the causation runs from consumption to advertising, which goes against Galbraith's thesis. bring down the price of x, helping to increase the welfare of others who really do desire it. Or it might add to the income of the x-manufacturers so as to bring about a net increase in welfare. 28 For this and other reasons the matter seems to be so complex that, compounded with the general difficulties in determining when the Pigovian argument applies, there seems little prospect of using these ideas to justify 27 For surveys of discussion of this issue, see, for example : Fullbrook 2002 , Mason 1998 , Pollak 1976 Of course any model capable of representing these kinds of scenarios would be of a nonlinear dynamic, possibly chaotic system. It is hard to see how one could use such a model to judge the efficiency of various outcomes the way one can with a stable equilibrium model. It is hard, after all, to judge the efficiency of outcomes when the outcomes refuse to stay still. Becker suggests that this kind of situation can be modelled as a stable equilibrium system, so that one can solve for maximum efficiency in Becker 1974. But note that his model assumes the degree and direction of interdependence among preferences -what Becker calls 'social capital' -to be constant and exogenous to the system, rather than being an endogenous variable. This assumption is the mere hope that reality will constrain itself to the mathematical capacities of its modellers.
redistribution. The interdependence of preferences might have some positive effects that should also be taken into account before making the Pigovian judgment.
Also, deciding whether Galbraith's argument applies to any given society would very likely require a general study of how social influences affect preference.
There is no reason to restrict the study to the two sorts of influences upon which
Galbraith almost exclusively focuses in The Affluent Society, namely advertising and envy. Moreover there are many other potential sources of preference-distortion that are not all distinctively social in character; these may also have to be taken into account.
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Conclusion
Galbraith's argument thus rests heavily upon a promissory note about the possible deliverances of an improved theory of preference. It is also not his only argument in favour of greater public spending. There are many well-known arguments referring to the need for fiscal policy to ensure macroeconomic stability, many of which Galbraith employed and developed. Indeed, I suspect that these sorts of argument are currently, on the whole, more compelling towards that end than any that rely upon the dependence effect theory. There are also other ways to make the case for redistribution. Again, there is a macroeconomic case -or variety of cases. As Keynes proposed: "measures for the redistribution of incomes in a way likely to raise the propensity to consume may prove positively favourable to the growth of capital" (Keynes 1960, 373) . There are also the cases that appeal to the idea of a relatively equitable society as a public good, and those that reject the preference-satisfaction view of welfare. 31 But, unlike these cases, the argument based on the dependence effect requires no normative or methodological commitments beyond those of standard microeconomics and consumer demand theory. There is enough in any undergraduate microeconomics textbook to make the case, assuming only that the relevant facts about preference information and misinformation are roughly as reported by Galbraith. This, I believe, is interesting for two reasons.
First, it helps to reveal a somewhat hidden potential of standard microeconomic theory to engage interesting questions concerning social choice. This is interesting even to those who are, as I am, highly dubious about the foundations of standard microeconomics. 32 It is common to suppose that microeconomics left to itself is guided, as if by an invisible hand, to recommend laissez-faire policies. Thus active fiscal policy must be justified in terms of macroeconomic ideas about business cycles, mostly inexplicable in purely microeconomic terms, while redistributive Mosler 2010 , Wray 2012 . It is interesting to note that James Galbraith is one of a handful of academic economists who appreciate the insights of MMT.
31 On the first argument, see Wilkinson and Pickett 2010 . On the second, see Hausman and McPherson 2006, ch.8, Sen 1977. 32 A philosophical case against it can be found in Rosenberg 1992 . A set of even more troubling criticisms, less dependent on contentious philosophical ideas, can be found in the first few chapters of Keen 2011. interventions in the free market must be justified in terms of normative commitments going beyond the basic ideals of welfare and efficiency embodied in standard microeconomic models. 33 Galbraith's neo-Pigovian argument is an interesting counterexample to such claims.
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Secondly, it highlights the difference between defending public spending as such and defending it as an efficient means of directing income towards where it will provide the most benefit. Political pressure naturally goes in the direction of pushing governments to use public spending to bribe the middle classes rather than helping those in most need. Such action may nevertheless fulfil the requirements of Keynesian macroeconomic policy. Arguments for the latter thus tend to be essentially for public spending and only at best accidentally for redistribution. Galbraith's dependence effect argument, if I have interpreted it rightly, is just the reverse. It is fundamentally a version of the Pigovian redistribution argument. It works to justify public spending only insofar as (1) serving the needs of the less affluent is a less wasteful use of money, in basic utilitarian terms, than serving the needs of the more affluent, and (2) the most burning needs of the less affluent are for public services.
35 33 To take a currently prominent example: when Thomas Piketty states that "no matter how justified inequalities of wealth may be initially, fortunes can grow and perpetuate themselves beyond all reasonable limits and beyond any possible rational justification in terms of social utility" and that "[e]very fortune is partially justified yet potentially excessive" (Piketty 2014, 440-1) , he employs standards of reasonability, social utility, and fairness going well beyond Pareto measures of preferencemaximization.
34 James Galbraith claims that his father, probably rightly, repudiated the macro/micro division (Galbraith 2008, 497) . Even so, it is interesting that the argument discussed in this article can work within the terms of standard microeconomics as conceived by those who uphold the division.
35 James Galbraith resembles his father in this respect. He also believes that government spending should be promoted as a means of addressing the most urgent social need rather than as a means of Abstract I argue that John Kenneth Galbraith's theory of the "dependence effect" in The Affluent Society provides a way to rescue A.C. Pigou's argument for wealth redistribution from a powerful objection. The objection is based on the unprovability of statements making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Galbraith's dependence effect theory allows him to present a version of the Pigovian argument that requires no such statements to be made. I argue that Galbraith's main piece of advocacy in The Affluent Society was for income redistribution, despite the fact that he claimed to be in favour of greater spending in the public sector rather than redistribution as such. I then show how my reading of the dependence effect theory helps to defend it against objections from Hayek and Rothbard. I end by discussing what improvements in economics a proper test of the theory would require and showing how my reading of it helps to reveal the ongoing importance of The Affluent Society to the understanding of political economy.
